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LIMITING THE WRONGFULLY DISCHARGED
ATTORNEY'S RECOVERY TO QUANTUM
MERUIT-FRACASSE v. BRENT
What remedies should be available to an attorney who, after part
performance under a contract of employment, is discharged without
cause by the client? In Fracasse v. Brent,' California recently adopted
the rule of a minority of jurisdictions which limits the discharged attor-
ney's recovery to the reasonable value of services actually rendered.2
The purpose of this quantum meruit limitation is to enable a client to
discharge the attorney with or without cause without fear of having to
pay the discharged attorney for all services agreed upon in the con-
tract-even those not yet rendered.3 In contrast, most states permit the
wrongfully discharged attorney to recover damages measured by the
full contract price;4 such a recovery is consonant with ordinary con-
tract principles.5 The minority rule departs from these ordinary con-
tract principles in order to make the employment of substitute counsel
less burdensome to the client. Greater freedom to substitute legal
representation promotes the client's ability to be confident in the skill,
loyalty and integrity of his attorney. The basis for the minority rule is
a public policy which regards such confidence as beneficial, if not
necessary, to the administration of justice.6  This note will examine the
bases for the majority and minority rules,7 analyze the scope of Fracasse.
and conclude that the benefits of limiting an attorney's recovery to quan-
tum meruit are significant, whereas the possible undesirable conse-
quences are relatively small and, for the most part, speculative.
The Majority and Minority Rules
Upon wrongful discharge, an attorney in most states may recover as
1. 6 Cal. 3d 784, 494 P.2d 9, 100 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1972).
2. See note 20 infra.
3. See text accompanying notes 99-102 infra.
4. See note 8 infra.
5. See note 9 infra.
6. See text accompanying notes 116-18 infra.
7. This note will use the terms "majority rule" and "minority rule" without fur-
ther reference to mean, respectively, the rule permitting a wrongfully discharged attor-
ney to recover damages and the rule limiting such attorney's recovery to quantum
meruit where, in each case, the attorney has not fully performed.
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damages the full contract price.8 This measure of damages is a product
of the attorney's status as an independent contractor as opposed to an
employee.' The prima facie measure of recovery for both independ-
ent contractors and employees is the contract price; however, the em-
ployee has a duty to mitigate damages by securing substitute employ-
ment."° On the theory that the original contract of employment does
not preclude an attorney "independent contractor" from accepting other
concurrent employment, the duty to mitigate upon wrongful discharge
is deemed inapplicable and damages may be recovered by the attorney-
independent contractor at the full contract price.1 For example, if an
attorney contracts to perform a specific service for a fixed fee of
$500.00 and is thereafter discharged by the client without cause prior
to having completed the service, the attorney, because of his status as
an independent contractor, would be entitled to damages amounting to
$500.00. The full contract price would be awarded under the major-
ity rule even though it might far exceed the reasonable value of serv-
ices rendered.
States which permit the wrongfully discharged attorney to seek
damages generally also permit an alternative recovery based on quan-
tum meruit.'2  In two instances the option to pursue quantum meruit
8. E.g., Goodkind v. Wolkowsky, 151 Fla. 62, 9 So. 2d 553 (1942); Higgins v.
Beatty, 242 N.C. 479, 88 S.E.2d 80 (1955); Kent v. Fishblate, 247 Pa. 361, 93 A.
509 (1915); Mandell & Wright v. Thomas, 441 S.W.2d 841, 847 (Tex. 1969); see
Fracasse v. Brent, 6 Cal. 3d 784, 797 n.3, 494 P.2d 9, 18 n.3, 100 Cal. Rptr. 385, 394
n.3 (1972); Annot., 54 A.L.R.2d 604, 609-15 (1957) (noncontingent fee contracts);
Annot., 136 A.L.R. 231, 245-51 (1942) (contingent fee contracts).
Some jurisdictions, while allowing a wrongfully discharged attorney to recover
damages, cut back from the full contract price, but not to the extent of requiring
mitigation. In Arkansas, for example, the contract price is reduced by out-of-pocket
expenses which would have been incurred in performing the balance of the contract
provided the client has not separately agreed to reimburse the attorney for such ex-
penses. Bockman v. Rorex, 212 Ark. 948, 953-54, 208 S.W.2d 991, 995 (1948). In
Wisconsin the measure of damages is the contract price less fair allowance for serv-
ices and expenses saved the attorney by reason of discharge. Tonn v. Reuter, 6 Wis.
2d 498, 505, 95 N.W.2d 261, 265 (1959). See generally 1960 Wis. L. REV. 156.
9. See, e.g., Associated Indem. Corp. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 56 Cal. App.
2d 804, 808, 133 P.2d 698, 700 (1943) (attorney under general retainer not entitled
to workmen's compensation because independent contractor not employee); RESTATE-
mENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1, comment e at 11 (1957) (attorney is independent
contractor).
10. See text accompanying notes 49-50 infra. See also C. MCCORMICK, HAND-
BOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 41 at 148-49, § 158 at 627 (1935).
11. See note 10 supra.
12. See, e.g., Barthels v. Garrels, 206 Mo. App. 199, 213, 227 S.W. 910, 915
(1920); Simon v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 45 N.D. 251, 257, 177 N.W. 107, 108
(1920). See generally 5 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 1102-04 (1964); Annot,
136 A.L.R. 231, 245-51 (1942) (contingent fee contracts).
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is particularly advantageous to the attorney. First, since the contract
price is not ordinarily considered a limit on quantum meruit recovery,' 8
the attorney may recover more on quantum meruit than in damages
where unexpectedly lengthy and difficult services were rendered. 4
Second, the attorney's cause of action to recover the contract price under
a contingent fee contract does not accrue until the happening of the
contingency;' 5 the cause of action for quantum meruit, on the other
hand, accrues immediately upon discharge. The attorney may, in this
situation, prefer the more immediate and certain recovery of quantum
meruit.
Under the majority rule it is said that the client has a "right" to dis-
charge his attorney, 16 but where the discharge is without cause, the
client, for exercising this "right" becomes subject to a liability for
damages.' 7  It would be more accurate to say that the client has a power
to discharge without cause, subject to incurring a liability for damages.
A right to discharge would exist only when the attorney has given the
client cause for discontinuing his employment and the jurisdiction, in
such cases, denies even quantum meruit recovery.'"
13. E.g., Adams v. Burbank, 103 Cal. 646, 650, 37 P. 640, 641 (1894). See gen-
erally 5 A. CORBIN, CoRBIN ON CoTrrAc'rs § 1113 (1964).
14. See generally, Annot., 109 A.L.R. 674 (1937).
15. See, e.g., Weil v. Finneran, 70 Ark. 509, 511, 69 S.W. 310, 311 (1902); In re
Downs, 363 S.W.2d 679, 686 (Mo. 1963) (dictum). But see Williams v. Philadelphia,
208 Pa. 282, 291, 57 A. 578, 579 (1904) (full fee may be recovered on establishing
collectibility of client's claim).
16. E.g., Tonn v. Reuter, 6 Wis. 2d 498, 503, 95 N.W.2d 261, 264 (1959).
17. Id. In addition, in most states-including those which have adopted the mi-
nority rule-an attorney's lien for his services is created by virtue of statutory or com-
mon law. See generally 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client §§ 207-11 (1937). California
lacks a statutory attorney's lien and does not recognize common law attorney's liens.
Ex Parte Kyle, 1 Cal. 331 (1850). However, in dictum the California Supreme
Court recently stated, "[1it is problematical whether much vitality remains in the Kyle
rule." Isrin v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. 2d 153, 158, 403 P.2d 728, 732, 45 Cal. Rptr. 320,
324 (1965).
When the contract is for a contingent fee, California has taken the position that an
equitable lien upon the client's recovery is automatically created. Fifield Manor v.
Finston, 54 Cal. 2d 632, 641, 354 P.2d 1073, 1079, 7 Cal. Rptr. 377, 383 (1960) (dic-
tum). Furthermore, California courts have permitted a lien to be created by the ex-
press terms of the attorney-client contract of employment. Haupt v. Charlie's Kosher
Mkt., 17 Cal. 2d 843, 845, 112 P.2d 627, 628 (1941). Therefore, an attorney in Cali-
fornia may acquire lien protection equivalent to attorneys in other states.
18. See, e.g., Crowley v. Wolf, 281 N.Y. 59, 64-65, 22 N.E.2d 234, 237 (1939);
Miller v. Solomon, 49 Ill. App. 2d 156, 169, 199 N.E.2d 660, 667 (1964) (dictum
which suggests that quantum meruit should be denied only for grosser forms of mis-
conduct by the attorney). Contra, Moore v. Fellner, 50 Cal. 2d 330, 341-42, 325 P.2d
857, 863 (1958) (quantum meruit recovery allowed where discharge is for cause);
Salopek v. Schoemann, 20 Cal. 2d 150, 153, 124 P.2d 21, 23 (1942). See gener-
ally REsTATEMENT OF CoNTRACTS § 357 (1932).
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In contrast to the majority rule, a minority of jurisdictions refuse
to afford the same remedies to a discharged attorney as are available to
discharged independent contractors. Under this minority view, a client
is given not only the power, but the "right"' 9 to terminate the employ-
ment relationship regardless of the contract's express terms by virtue
of an implied term that the client may discharge the attorney with or
without cause. Since the client has not breached the contract in ex-
ercising the right of discharge, the attorney cannot recover damages.
Therefore, if the discharged attorney has only partially performed, he
may recover from the client only on quantum meruit.2-
In most states under either the majority or minority view, the con-
tract price is not a limit of the discharged attorney's recovery under
quantum meruit, '' and whether this restitutionary remedy should be
limited by the contract has been the subject of academic debate. 22
The protection afforded to the client becomes illusory if the discharged
attorney's recovery on quantum meruit exceeds the contract price. At
least one state has limited the discharged attorney's quantum meruit
recovery to the contract price. -a
19. Courts using the minority rnle speak in terms of perfecting the client's right of
discharge. See note 62 infra. Nevertheless, because the client remains liable in
quantum ineruit to the wrongfully discharged attorney, it would be more accurate to
say that under both the minority and majority views, the client has a power to discharge
the attorney, except that under the minority rule the exercise of such power gives rise
to fewer liabilities. Such semantical difficulties would arise less frequently were the
attorney's rights after part performance under a contract of employment limited to a
reliance interest. See text accompanying notes 59-63 infra.
20. Newman v. Melton Truck Lines, Inc., 443 F.2d 896, 897 (5th Cir. 1971)
(contingent fee, Mississippi); Cole v. Myers, 128 Conn. 223, 228-30, 21 A.2d 396, 399-
400 (1941) (contingent fee); Henry v. Vance, 111 Ky. 72, 81-82, 63 S.W. 273, 276
(1901) (contingent fee); Lawler v. Dunn, 145 Minn. 281, 284, 176 N.W. 989, 990
(1920) (noncontingent fee); Harris v. Root, 28 Mont. 159, 168, 72 P. 429, 432 (1903)
(contingent fee); Baker v. Zikas, 176 Neb. 290, 293, 125 N.W.2d 715, 717 (1964)
(contingent fee); Martin v. Camp, 219 N.Y. 170, 174, 114 N.E. 46, 48 (1916) (contin-
gent fee); Ritz v. Carpenter, 43 S.D. 236, 240-41, 178 N.W. 877, 879 (1920) (noncon-
tingent fee, dictum); Wright v. Johanson, 132 Wash. 682, 691, 233 P. 16, 19 (1925)
(contingent fee); see Shiro v. Perkins, 240 So. 2d 920, 923 (La. Ct. App. 1970), cert.
denied, 257 La. 458, 242 So. 2d 578 (1971) (contract between attorney and client
creates a revocable mandate); cf. In re Phelps, 204 Kan. 16, 25, 459 P.2d 172, 178
(1969) (semble, dictum). But see Carter v. McPherson, 104 Kan. 59, 65, 177 P. 533,
535 (1919).
21. E.g., In re Montgomery, 272 N.Y. 323, 327, 6 N.E.2d 40, 41 (1936). See
generally Annot., 109 A.L.R. 674 (1937).
22. E.g., Palmer, The Contract Price As a Limit On Restitution for Defendant's
Breach, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 264 (1959).
23. See Henry v. Vance, Ill Ky. 72, 63 S.W. 273 (1901): [11n estimating
such value the jury should consider the extent of services rendered, and those to be ren-
dered, allowing the contract price, as abated by such sum as is reasonably represented
by the unperformed part of the labor." Id. at 82, 63 S.W. at 276.
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The California Experience-Fracasse v. Brent
Prior to Fracasse v. Brent,24 California adhered to the majority
rule; adoption of the minority rule required the overruling of a long
line of precedent.2  Cases enabling the wrongfully discharged attorney
to recover the contract price as damages date back to 1854. In Bald-
win v. Bennett,20 the attorney was to be paid a fixed $5,000 fee con-
tingent upon securing certain realty to the client. Prior to litigation,
the client, without the knowledge of the attorney, settled his claim and
conveyed his interest to the opposing party. The client was deemed to
have breached the contract, thereby entitling the attorney to damages
equal to the contract price."
The Baldwin rule was further entrenched by subsequent decisions.
For example, in Webb v. Trescony,28 an attorney agreed to defend a cli-
ent in a criminal case for a fixed fee of $950. The attorney appeared
and conducted the defense during the course of a year. Thereafter, he
was discharged without cause. The attorney was awarded the full
contract price as damages.29 Furthermore, the Baldwin rule was ap-
plied to contingency fee situations. In Bartlett v. Odd Fellows' Savings
Bank,30 a wrongfully discharged attorney operating on a contingent fee
contract was allowed the previously agreed percentage of any subsequent
recovery. The cause of action for damages, however, was held not to
accrue until the happening of the agreed contingency.-'
A later case, Brown v. Connolly3 2 stated the reason for delaying
the accrual of a cause of action for damages under a contingent fee con-
tract until the happening of the contingency. In Brown, the attorney
sought to recover $4,500,000 for his client under a 25 percent contin-
gent fee contract. After filing the action and rendering substantial serv-
ices, the attorney was discharged without cause. The attorney then
sought $1,125,000 damages from his former client-one-quarter of
the total claim. The client had not then recovered on his claim, and,
reaffirming the rule of Bartlett, the court said:
Any contrary rule would be palpably unjust. Experience
has shown that more often than not the size of a party's claim
bears little relation to its value. Such a rule ...allowing judg-
ment for attorney fees based upon a percentage of a wishful esti-
24. 6 Cal. 3d 784, 494 P.2d 9, 100 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1972).
25. Id. at 797 n.2, 494 P.2d at 18 n.2, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 394 n.2.
26. 4 Cal. 392 (1854).
27. Id. at 393-94.
28. 76 Cal. 621, 18 P. 796 (1888).
29. Id. at 622-23, 18 P. at 797.
30. 79 Cal. 218, 21 P. 743 (1889).
31. Id. at 222, 21 P. at 744.
32. 2 Cal. App. 3d 867, 83 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1969).
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mate (often by the attorney) of the client's claim before its liqui-
dation or any recovery thereon, would often lead to grossly unfair
consequences. A client, unfortunate enough to have misconceived
a reason to discharge his attorney, without any recovery on his claim
could find himself adjudged to pay many times its value-a disas-
ter to the client and a windfall to the attorney.
33
In applying the majority rule as formulated by Baldwin, other Cali-
fornia cases allowed an election of quantum meruit recovery where the
attorney was wrongfully discharged, 34  and restricted recovery to quan-
tum meruit where the discharge was for cause.35
Despite this precedent, the California Supreme Court abandoned the
majority rule in Fracasse v. Brent.36  In that case, an attorney, Fra-
casse, was employed by Brent, a woman of modest means, to prosecute
on her behalf an action to recover damages for personal injuries. An
express written contingent fee contract was entered into in March,
1969.17  About nine months later, but prior to any recovery, Brent
discharged Fracasse and retained another attorney.38  Attorney Fra-
casse elected not to sue in quantum meruit and, since there had been
no recovery, his cause of action for damages under the contingent fee
contract had not accrued. He therefore brought an action for a decla-
ration that the client discharged him without cause, thereby breaching
the contract. Fracasse also sought a declaration that he would be en-
titled to a one-third interest in any subsequent recovery. The California
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court which had dis-
missed the complaint without leave to amend.
This holding may be divided into three parts: (1) An attorney
who is discharged with or without cause may recover only the reason-
33. Id. at 870-71, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 160.
34. Kirk v. Culley, 202 Cal. 501, 506, 261 P. 994, 996 (1927) (contingent fee);
Elconin v. Yalen, 208 Cal. 546, 548-49, 282 P. 791, 792 (1929) (noncontingent fee,
semble).
35. Salopek v. Schoemann, 20 Cal. 2d 150, 153, 124 P.2d 21, 23 (1942).
36. 6 Cal. 3d 784, 494 P.2d 9, 100 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1972).
37. By the terms of the contract the attorney would receive one-third of any
settlement made at least thirty days before the date originally set for trial and forty
percent of any recovery obtained thereafter. Id. at 786, 494 P.2d at 10, 100 Cal. Rptr.
at 386.
38. Whether the client had cause for discharge was not at issue on appeal. The
trial court sustained a demurrer against the plaintiff attorney holding that the action
for declaratory relief was premature under Brown v. Connolly, 2 Cal. App. 3d 867, 83
Cal. Rptr. 158 (1969). In Brown, the court held that an action for damages by a wrong-
fully discharged attorney under a contingent fee contract does not accrue until the hap-
pening of the contingency. The court of appeal in Fracasse reversed, holding that
Brown does not apply to actions for declaratory relief. The California Supreme
Court, however, affirmed the judgment of the trial court, but on an entirely different
theory. See text accompanying notes 40-43 infra.
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able value of services rendered on behalf of the former client; 9 (2)
the discharged attorney's cause of action to recover the reasonable value
of services rendered under a contingent fee contract accrues on the hap-
pening of the contingency; 40 (3) the trial court was correct in refusing
to exercise its discretion to allow declaratory relief prior to the accrual
of the cause of action for quantum meruit.41  Thus, the Fracasse deci-
sion extends the conventional minority position by affording special
protection to clients who contract for a contingent fee; if the contract
is for such a fee, the discharged attorney's quantum meruit cause of ac-
tion will not accrue until the happening of the contingency. For ex-
ample, if an attorney attempts to recover personal injury damages for
his client under a contingent fee contract, and, after part performance,
is discharged without legal cause, the discharged attorney must wait
until the former client recovers on his claim before he may seek to re-
cover the reasonable value of his services. Should the client be unsuc-
cessful, the discharged attorney is not entitled to compensation.
In holding that an attorney's cause of action to recover quantum
meruit under a contingent fee contract does not accrue until the hap-
pening of the contingency, Fracasse adopted a position not found in any
other state. Two reasons were advanced for such an innovation. First,
the "result obtained" and "amount involved," both recognized factors
in determining the reasonableness of an attorney's compensation,
cannot be fairly determined until the happening of the contingency.
42
Second, the fact that the contract is for a contingent fee indicates that
the client is probably a person of limited means. It would, therefore,
be unduly burdensome for the client to become liable to pay the first
attorney regardless of whether the underlying claim is ever successfully
recovered.
43
In so changing the California rule, the Fracasse majority could
not find substantive support in the long line of California cases follow-
ing Baldwin for limiting an attorney's measure of recovery to quantum
meruit.44  This is not unexpected, since those cases simply applied, with-
39. Fracasse v. Brent, 6 Cal. 3d 784, 792, 494 P.2d 9, 14-15, 100 Cal. Rptr. 385,
390-91 (1972).
40. Id. at 792, 494 P.2d at 15, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
41. Id. at 792-93, 494 P.2d at 15, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 391. The court refused to de-
cide whether there might be .cases in which declaratory relief might be proper prior
to the occurrence of the stated contingency. Id. at 793, 494 P.2d at 15, 100 Cal. Rptr.
at 391.
42. Id. at 792, 494 P.2d at 14, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
43. Id.
44. In 1942 Chief Justice Gibson and Justice Traynor urged adoption of the
minority position in Salopek v. Schoemann, 20 Cal. 2d at 156-58, 124 P.2d at 24-25
(concurring opinion). See also Denio v. City of Huntington Beach, 22 Cal. 2d 580,
613-14, 140 P.2d 392, 404-05 (1943) (dissenting opinion). The Salopek concurrence,
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out much examination, a familiar damages formula. Furthermore, the
equities in favor of the client in Fracasse, although substantial, were not
overwhelming.1 5  Rather, the primary basis for the decision was the
court's conviction that, on public policy grounds, the former rule was
undesirable.4 6  Two inquiries must be made in order to evaluate this
judicial intervention into the attorney-client contract of employment.
First, the theoretical underpinnings and operational utility of permit-
ting a recovery of damages must be assessed.4 7 Then the relevant pub-
lic policies allegedly promoted by limiting the attorney's recovery to
quantum meruit must be defined.48
The Majority Rule-Theoretical Basis and Operational Utility
The reasons for permitting wrongfully discharged attorneys to re-
cover as damages the full contract price are similar to those used to jus-
tify such recovery by other independent contractors, namely the im-
practicability of demonstrating mitigation and the difficulty of appor-
tioning the value of professional services.40 In addition, the attorney's
duty to avoid conflicts of interest is sometimes advanced as a special
reason for allowing such recovery. 50 The concept of prevention of per-
formance by a party, sometimes cited in support of the majority rule, 5'
does not reach the critical issue. Prevention merely defines the circum-
stance of the breach;5 2 it does not help in deciding whether the ag-
grieved person should be required to mitigate damages.
extensively quoted by the majority in Fracasse, was the only direct support available in
prior cases. The majority in Fracasse cited language in two prior California cases
which it felt was "irreconcilable" with the rule of Baldwin v. Bennett. 6 Cal. 3d at
790, 494 P.2d at 13, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 389. Justice Sullivan's dissent, however, pointed
out that this language was dictum and, indeed, each of the cases contained language
directly supporting the former rule. Id. at 800-02, 494 P.2d at 20-21, 100 Cal. Rptr.
at 396-97.
45. The client was forced to defend in the action for declaratory relief while at
the same time pursuing her underlying claim for personal injuries. The discharged at-
torney already had an equitable lien upon the client's recovery provided the discharge
had been wrongful. See note 17 supra. Thus, although the client's limited resources
were diverted, the attorney had a legitimate interest in determining in advance of the
former client's recovery whether the discharge was without cause.
46. See text accompanying note 117 infra.
47. See text accompanying notes 49-84 infra.
48. See text accompanying notes 85-118 infra.
49. E.g., Brodie v. Watkins, 33 Ark. 545, 548 (1878).
50. Scheinesohn v. Lemonek, 84 Ohio St. 424, 95 N.E. 913 (1911).
51. E.g., Fracasse v. Brent, 6 Cal. 3d 784, 799, 494 P.2d 9, 19, 100 Cal. Rptr.
385, 395 (1972) (dissenting opinion). The dissent, in attempting to refute the ma-
jority's conclusion that Baldwin v. Bennett, 4 Cal. 392 (1854), contained no persuasive
rationale for permitting the recovery of damages, maintained that Baldwin implicitly
adopted the prevention analysis of Hunt v. Test, 8 Ala. 713 (1845).




Impracticability of Demonstrating Mitigation
Independent contractors, including lawyers, are not required, as
are employees, to seek substitute employment upon wrongful dis-
charge.53 Requiring a discharged employee to seek substitute employ-
ment is an example of mitigation, a principle which generally attempts to
limit recovery to the loss actually suffered and denies recovery for losses
which reasonably could have been avoided. The most common justifi-
cation for not requiring independent contractors to mitigate is that,
unlike the employee, the independent contractor is not precluded by
the contract of employment from performing contemporaneous services
for other employers. Therefore the discharge of an independent con-
tractor does not free an ascertainable amount of time which may be use-
fully devoted to other employment.54 Furthermore, requiring mitiga-
tion of wrongfully discharged independent contractors would seem to
impose unreasonable evidentiary problems.55 It would be extremely
difficult for a party to demonstrate that other contemporaneous employ-
ment did or did not mitigate the loss. In fact, if the concept of miti-
gation were introduced into the attorney-client relationship, the at-
torney would usually still recover the full contract price because the
employer bears the burden of proving that the discharged employee has
or reasonably could have secured employment.56
Accepting the impracticability of demonstrating mitigation by in-
dependent contractors still leaves the question of what recovery should
then ensue. Traditional contracts theory would hold that contracts
are enforceable, if at all, to the full extent of their value, and therefore
the full contract price should be recovered. 57  On the other hand
one must be reconciled, under this thinking, to allowing recovery to ex-
ceed actual loss. Excess recovery would occur whenever the independ-
53. See generally Annot., 15 A.L.R. 751 (1921) (lists occupations which have
not been required to mitigate damages).
54. E.g., Payne v. Pathe Studios, Inc., 6 Cal. App. 2d 136, 142, 44 P.2d 598, 600
(1935). Formerly, employees were permitted to remain idle after discharge and sue
for their compensation as it became due. This rule has been largely abandoned be-
cause it creates needless economic waste. 5 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRAcrS § 1095
(1964). Hence a discharged employee is under a "duty" to make reasonable efforts
to secure substitute employment. E.g., McClelland v. Climax Hosiery Mills, 252 N.Y.
347, 358-59, 169 N.E. 605, 609-10 (1930).
55. Cf. Baldwin v. Bennett, 4 Cal. 392 (1854). The evidentiary purpose was prob-
ably contemplated by the court in Baldwin when it wrote: "The [client] not only breaks
his contract, but also deprives the [attorney] of showing the amount of injury under the
general rule." Id. at 394.
56. E.g., De Angeles v. Roos Bros., Inc., 244 Cal. App. 2d 434, 441-42, 52 Cal.
Rptr. 783, 789 (1966).
57. 11 S. WILLISTON, A ThEATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1315 (3d ed..
W. Jaeger 1968).
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ent contractor in fact succeeded in substituting one commitment of re-
sources for another. It would be fiction to suggest that an independent
contractor can "tool up" to serve an indefinite number of employers.
The impracticability of proving such a substitution, and not the ab-
sence in fact of substitution, should be considered the primary basis for
not requiring independent contractors to mitigate. The unfairness of
permitting excess recoveries by independent contractors in general
might be tolerated, but the practice should not persist where import-
ant public policies are contravened.
Sufficient policy grounds are present in contracts of employment
between attorney and client to necessitate a departure from conven-
tional contract theories in order to avoid unfairness. 58 One such de-
parture, which would limit recovery to actual loss, would be to protect
the attorney only to the extent of his reliance upon the contract. 9 Some
writers have suggested formal recognition of a reliance interest in con-
tract. Normally quantum meruit is considered a species of restitution
entirely apart from the contract; it is therefore not considered a form
of damages.6" Where, however, a reliance interest in contract is recog-
nized, damages recoverable under the contract would be limited to the
reasonable value of services using the contract price as an upper
limit.61
Although Fracasse effectively limits an attorney to a reliance in-
terest in the attorney-client contract, the court did not create doctrinal
precedent for damages limited to the reliance interest. Instead, the
court injected an implied term into the attorney-client contract ren-
dering such contracts terminable at the will of the client. 62  Hence,
the attorney's restitutionary recovery remains separate from the con-
tract because the client who terminates technically has not breached
58. See text accompanying notes 99-118 infra.
59. Childres & Garamella, The Law of Restitution and the Reliance Interest in
Contract, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 433 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Childres & Garamella];
Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1 & 2, 46 YALE L.J. 52,
373 (1936-37).
60. McConnell v. Corona City Water Co., 149 Cal. 60, 64-65, 85 P. 929, 930
(1906); see Oliver v. Campbell, 43 Cal. 2d 298, 302, 273 P.2d 15, 17-18 (1954).
61. See Childres & Garamella, supra note 59, at 451-57.
62. "We have concluded that a client should have both the power and the right
at any time to discharge his attorney with or without cause. Such a discharge does not
constitute a breach of contract for the reason that it is a basic term of the contract,
implied by law into it by reason of the special relationship between the contracting
parties, that the client may terminate that contract at will." Fracasse v. Brent, 6 Cal.
3d at 790-91, 494 P.2d at 13, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 389. Since the client does not breach
the contract in discharging the attorney, the attorney's recovery cannot be character-
ized as damages, and falls within the traditional scope of restitutionary recovery apart
from the contract. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 452 (1957).
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the contract. The implied term is a patent fiction; under any objective
test a client who discharges an attorney without cause has breached the
agreement.03 Resorting to implied terms delays needed reforms in
the theory of damages but enables the court to make ad hoc interven-
tions in types of contracts which, for policy reasons, should be pro-
tected only to the extent of the reliance interest.
Difficulty of Apportioning the Value of Legal Services
Another commonly cited rationale in favor of nonmitigation fol-
lowing an attorney's wrongful discharge is that each hour of a lawyer's
service does not produce an equal increment of value to the client. This
principle was discussed at length in the leading case of Brodie v. Wat-
kins:04
Legal services . . . cannot be apportioned either by time, or
the amount of physical labor expended in drawing papers, attend-
ing courts, and oral arguments. It is the attorney's judgment, his
learning, his responsibility and advice, which is relied upon, and
which gives the particular value to legal services. Perhaps the
most difficult and valuable services of the attorney may be rendered
in considering his client's case, and giving him confidential infor-
mation, before any visible act is done.0 5
The weakness of this argument lies in the fact that it furnishes
greater logical support for quantum meruit recovery than for damages
equal to the contract price. It is true that an attorney's services are not
allocable in the same sense as those of a salaried person performing rep-
etitious labor. The first ten hours of work on a legal task ultimately
requiring one hundred hours may far exceed ten percent of the value to
the client in terms of knowledge of his legal rights and best possible
course of action. Nevertheless, the possible unfairness to the attorney of
attempting to allocate legal services does not justify awarding the entire
contract price as damages. This solution merely transfers the burden of
possible unfairness from the attorney to the client. Quantum meruit,
on the other hand, obviates the major difficulty posed by this rationale
-the quantum meruit formula accounts for all conceivably relevant
factors including the experience of counsel, the difficulty of the subject
matter, and the stage of proceedings in which services are rendered. 66
63. Justice Sullivan in his dissenting opinion in Fracasse refused to acknowledge
the validity of the implied term and the entire dissent is based upon the premise that
the client had breached the contract. See 6 Cal. 3d at 793-804, 494 P.2d at 15-23, 100
Cal. Rptr. at 391-99.
64. 33 Ark. 545 (1878); see Kikuchi v. Ritchie, 202 F. 857, 859 (9th Cir. 1913).
65. 33 Ark. at 548.
66. See, e.g., Los Angeles v. Los Angeles-Inyo Farms Co., 134 Cal. App. 268, 276,
25 P.2d 224, 227-28 (1933). The factors to be taken into account by the court in
computing the reasonable value of an attorney's services include: "[tihe nature of
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Finally, the quantum meruit determination is normally made by the
trial judge, an individual wholly familiar with the matter of attorneys'
fees. 7
Duty to Avoid Conflicts of Interest
Rules prohibiting conflict of interest are sometimes advanced to
justify an award of the full contract price. The detriment imposed
upon attorneys by the rule against conflicts of interest was discussed as
follows in the case of Scheinesohn v. Lemonek:6 8
Peculiar and confidential relations are often formed, and it
not infrequently happens that in the relations thus brought about the
attorney obtains private information respecting his client's busi-
ness which he may not afterwards divulge. This consideration
would prevent . . . the discharged attorney from taking employ-
ment from the opposite party. Such instances would be rare, still
they occasionally occur, and a rule of damage which would en-
tirely ignore this consideration would hardly meet with general
approval. 9
Certainly if there were no rules barring conflict of interest, dis-
charged attorneys would be much sought after by opposing parties. In
this sense, the obligation to forego employment involves considerable
detriment; the purpose of the conflict of interest rules, however, is
manifestly to prevent unfair conduct by the attorney.70 It would be
inconsistent with high ethical standards to consider abstention from un-
fair conduct as constituting, in any way, a legally relevant detriment to
the attorney. If, on the other hand, this rationale simply means that the
set of potential clients has temporarily been reduced by one, the harm
to the discharged attorney is normally inconsequential.
the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the
skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure of the attorney's efforts, the
attorney's skill and learning, including his age and experience in the particular type of
work demanded." Id. Additional criteria were provided in Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal.
App. 2d 652, 169 P.2d 453 (1946): "[tlhe intricacies and importance of the litigation,
the labor and the necessity for skilled legal training and ability in trying the cause, and
the time consumed." Id. at 679, 169 P.2d at 460.
67. See, e.g., Excelsior Union High School Dist. v. Lautrup, 269 Cal. App. 2d 434,
448, 74 Cal. Rptr. 835, 844 (1969). Judges obtain experience in determining reason-
able fees through statutory provisions which provide for the compensation of attorneys
in certain types of proceedings. See, e.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1255(a) (West 1972)
(eminent domain proceedings); CAL. CIv. CODE § 1717 (West 1970) (action upon con-
tracts which provide for the recovery of attorneys' fees).
68. 84 Ohio St. 424, 95 N.E. 913 (1911); accord, Myers v. Crockett, 14 Tex. 257,
259 (1855).
69. 84 Ohio St. at 436-37, 95 N.E. at 916.
70. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(a) (West 1962) (attorney's duty to
preserve confidences of the client); ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY
EC 5-14 (1971).
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Operational Utility of the Majority Rule
The previously discussed theoretical unfairness of permitting an
attorney to recover the full contract price7' is realized and, in fact,
amplified in practice. Having been made liable for the contract price
to the original attorney, the client must, in addition, pay substitute coun-
sel to proceed on the claim. The client thus may find the recovery sub-
stantially depleted by attorneys' fees. Under a contingent fee contract,
the discharged attorney's recovery is not the agreed percentage of an
offer of settlement obtained by the discharged attorney, but rather the
agreed percentage of the ultimate recovery. 72 Under this formula, one
client paid 73 1/3 percent of his recovery in attorney's fees. 73  Even if
the attorney's discharge is for cause, he may recover on quantum
meruit in some jurisdictions. 74  The financial hardship on the client is
not limited to a depletion of ultimate recovery; if the contract was for
a noncontingent fee or if the attorney elects to sue for the reasonable
value of services, the client may incur substantial liabilities whether
or not the underlying claim is successfully prosecuted. Furthermore,
whenever the recovery is based upon the contract rate, the attorney
often recovers far in excess of the reasonable value of his services.7
5
Despite these hardships, the proposition is sometimes advanced in
support of the majority rule that clients have no cause to complain since
they are treated the same as other employers; if the client incurs double
liability, it was the result of his own wrongful act. 76 Supporting the
majority rule on this ground, however, would betray an insensitivity to
the difficulties faced by a client who has lost confidence in the ability,
loyalty or diligence of his attorney. To a far greater degree than in
most employment relationships, the client is unable to assess the quality
of the service performed on his behalf.7 7  This inability denies the cli-
ent a fair opportunity to predict whether his discharge of the attorney
will be legally justifiable.
The unfairness of applying the objective standards for determining
whether the client has legal cause for discharge has been a major stimu-
71. See text accompanying notes 53-70 supra.
72. See Fivey v. Chambers, 199 Cal. App. 2d 457, 467, 19 Cal. Rptr. 111, 117-18
(1962).
73. Jones v. Brown, 84 Cal. App. 2d 390, 190 P.2d 956 (1948).
74. Cf. Moore v. Fellner, 50 Cal. 2d 330, 341-42, 325 P.2d 857, 863 (1958).
75. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Perlmutter, 308 Ill. App. 84, 31 N.E.2d 333 (1941)
(full contingent fee awarded to attorney who rendered no legal services beyond initial
consultation); accord, Dombey, Tyler, Richards & Grieser v. Detroit, T. & I. R.R., 351
F.2d 121, 127 (6th Cir. 1965).
76. Fivey v. Chambers, 199 Cal. App. 2d 457, 467, 19 Cal. Rptr. 111, 117 (1962).
77. See generally Mazor, Power and Responsibility in the Attorney-Client Rela-
tionship, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1120, 1121 (1968).
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lus for discarding the majority rule. If the client guesses wrongly and
the discharge is found to be without cause, he is subjected to an essen-
tially penal liability. 78 Some conduct which has been held to constitute
legal cause for discharge clearly is culpable. Such conduct includes
counseling adverse parties in the same case, 79 misstating the legal effect
of facts, and pursuing a course of action which if carried out would pro-
duce results contrary to the client's express intentions.80  Other, less
clear, cases arise where the attorney demands additional fees to prose-
cute an appeal8 or ridicules the client in the presence of others. 2
At times, behavior which might cause an average client to suspect di-
minished loyalty and zeal is sanctioned by currently accepted pro-
fessional ethics.
8 3
It is apparent that where the client is forced by fear of incurring
double liability to keep an attorney in whom he has lost confidence, the
intimacy of the attorney-client relationship, and hence the quality of le-
gal representation, may be impaired. The policies favoring the main-
tenance of the client's confidence in his attorney and the promotion of
greater efficiency in the adjudicatory process have been the primary jus-
tifications for departing from the majority rule. 4
Policies Favoring the Minority Rule
Since the majority rule is consistent with the normal operation of
contract law, the primary justifications for the minority rule are based
on other grounds-special considerations of public policy which give
the client greater legal freedom to switch legal representatives than an
employer would have to switch those employees who perform services
as independent contractors. Much of the difficulty inherent in formu-
lating just rules governing the attorney-client relationship may be traced
to the divergent roles of the lawyer. A lawyer in private practice rep-
resenting a client in specific litigation is at once a business man obtain-
ing a livelihood from fees charged for professional services, a trusted
agent of the client, and an "officer of the court.""5
78. See generally 1 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE 113-14 (2d ed. 1970).
79. Anderson v. Eaton, 211 Cal. 113, 116-17, 293 P. 788, 789-90 (1930).
80. Salopek v. Schoemann, 20 Cal. 2d 150, 155, 124 P.2d 21, 24 (1942).
81. Moore v. Fellner, 50 Cal. 2d 330, 341-42, 325 P.2d 857, 862-63 (1958) (suf-
ficient cause for discharge).
82. Zurich Gen. Accident & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Kinsler, 12 Cal. 2d 98, 81 P.2d 913
(1938) (insufficient cause for discharge).
83. See, e.g., Warner v. Basten, 118 Ill. App. 2d 419, 255 N.E.2d 72 (1969)
(client discovered that his attorney had previously represented defendant's insurer
in prior unrelated actions).
84. See text accompanying notes 99-118 infra.
85. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 124 (1961) (dictum).
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The attorney's interest in his fee focuses upon the business charac-
teristics of the attorney-client relationship. The majority rule denies
that the other two aspects of his role should influence the remedies
otherwise available. States which limit an attorney's recovery upon
discharge to quantum meruit justify the exception by reliance upon the
special requirements of trust and confidence in the agency relationship
and the attorney's role in the adjudicatory process. 86
The Attorney as a Purveyor of Professional Services for a Fee
In the United States each party must normally bear the burden of
compensating his attorney, and attorney's fees are not ordinarily re-
coverable as costs.8 7  The compensation of attorneys is considered a
matter of contract between the attorney and client88 subject to judicial
scrutiny in case of alleged unreasonableness.8 ' Historically, the dis-
tinction developed in England that solicitors could sue for fees, whereas
barristers could not.90 In our country, the legal profession was modeled
more after the English solicitor than barrister.9' Attorneys were, how-
ever, regarded with considerable hostility. 2 It would be natural to ex-
pect that, in consonance to the prevailing hostility, the United States (at
least on the issue of the attorney's right to sue for his fees) would adopt
a position based upon the English rule as to barristers. At least one
early case adopts this view. In 1819 the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania said in Mooney v. Lloyd:"3
The connection between counsel and client, in contempla-
tion of law, is honorable indeed. The counselor renders his best
services, and trusts to the gratitude of his client for reward. In
the language of Blackstone, 'a counsel can maintain no action for
his fees, which are given, not a locatio vel conductio, but as quid-
dam honorarium; not as salary for hire, but as a mere gratuity which
a counselor cannot demand, without doing wrong to his reputa-
tion.' 94
86. See text accompanying notes 110-18 infra.
87. See generally Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees land the Great
Society, 54 CALIF. L. Rnv. 792 (1966) (advocates allocating the burden of attorneys'
fees to loser in civil suit). In England the losing party in a civil suit reimburses the
winner for his legal fees. See Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849 (1929).
88. See, e.g., CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 1021 (West 1955): "Except as attorney's
fees are specifically provided for by statute, the measure and mode of compensation of
attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the
parties. ...
89. See, e.g., Tonn v. Reuter, 6 Wis. 2d 498, 504, 95 N.W.2d 261, 265 (1959).
90. 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 440 (1927).
91. See L. PATTERSON & E. CHEATHAM, THE PROFESSION OF LAW 15 (1971).
92. See generally R. POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTiQUrry TO MODERN TIMES
177-83 (1953).
93. 5 S. & R. 411 (Pa. 1819).
94. Id. at 414-15.
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This position proved to be short lived; in 1830 an attorney in Pennsyl-
vania was allowed to bring suit to recover fees under a contract. 95
It would then be logical to assume that the states, having rejected
the English rule as to barristers and in view of their hostility to lawyers,
would settle upon an intermediate position limiting an attorney's re-
covery to quantum meruit. The early weight of authority, however, is
unclear."0 Ultimately, the American legal profession generally suc-
ceeded in obtaining a judicial recognition that the initial contract of
employment be treated as if arrived by arm's length bargaining. This
recognition is found in the majority rule and in disciplinary rules gov-
erning the conduct of lawyers. The disciplinary rules do not prohibit
suits by a lawyer to recover fees; the formal standards of professional
ethics, however, discourage the practice.17 One recent case held that a
suit to recover compensation under a contract of employment, after a
previous action on an attorney's lien had been disallowed, constituted
harrassment incompatible with canon 14. Such conduct was consid-
ered one ground for disbarment.98
The Attorney as Agent of the Client
At the core of the minority rule is a strong social policy favoring
the representation of clients by attorneys in whom they have confi-
dence.99 This policy is accorded such great weight that, in order to
make substitution of legal representatives less burdensome on the client,
a "right" to revoke the contract of employment is afforded.1 °0 Under
general agency law a principal has no right to revoke an agency merely
for having lost confidence in the agent.' 1 To a lesser degree, however,
the confidence needed in conventional agency relationships is protected
by granting the principal a power to revoke subject to payment of dam-
ages.' 2 Jurisdictions adhering to the minority rule consider the
95. Gray v. Breckenridge, 2 Pen. & W. 75 (Pa. 1830).
96. Compare Harris v. Root, 28 Mont. 159, 72 P. 429 (1903) (limitation to
quantum meruit supported by weight of authority), vith Annot., 1917 F.L.R.A. 406,
408 (a majority of states allow damages to wrongfully discharged attorney).
97. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 14; ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-23 (1971): "A lawyer should be zealous in his efforts to avoid
controversies over fees with clients and should attempt to resolve amicably any differ-
ences on the subject. He should not sue a client for a fee unless necessary to prevent
fraud or gross imposition by a client."
98. In re Phelps, 204 Kan. 16, 24, 459 P.2d 172, 178-79 (1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 916 (1969).
99. See Martin v. Camp, 219 N.Y. 170, 173-74, 114 N.E. 46, 48 (1916).
100. Id. See note 19 supra.
101. 9 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1012 B at 36
(3d ed. W. Jaeger 1968).
102. See W. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 46, at 87-88 (1964).
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power to revoke the attorney's agency insufficient to protect the client's
need for confidence in his attorney. A fortiori, the minority rule places
a greater value on protecting the principal's need for confidence in his
agent in the attorney-client context than in other agency contexts.
In order to justify a rule favoring clients over other types of prin-
cipals, special characteristics of the attorney-client relationships must
be advanced. Factors which may be advanced include:
a. A public policy favoring effective legal representation; this pol-
icy may be impaired if clients feel compelled to continue in their em-
ployment attorneys in whom they have lost confidence.'
03
b. The client's lesser ability to evaluate the quality of legal serv-
ices. 0 4
c. The client's lesser ability to foresee whether he will remain con-
fident in the attorney initially selected. 0 5
Whether to afford a client the right to discharge the attorney is
only one issue in a broader controversy concerning the degree to which
ordinary rules governing agency relations should apply to the attorney
and client.10 6 Some argue that insufficient recognition has been given
to the inapplicability of many of the ordinary agency rules. 0 7 The cli-
ent's ignorance of the law contributes to a level of dependence upon the
attorney which contradicts the hypothetical principal's ability to control
the activities of the agent. 08 For example, under general agency law
a client as principal would be bound by a default judgment entered as
a result of his attorney's negligence.
10 9
An attorney's agency is revocable unless the agency is coupled with an interest. An
irrevocable agency is rarely found in the attorney-client context. See Annot., 97 A.LR.
923 (1935). In California, for example, an irrevocable agency is not created by a
purported assignment to the attorney of a portion of the client's cause of action.
O'Connell v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 2d 418, 41 P.2d 334 (1935).
103. See text accompanying notes 110-18 infra.
104. See note 105 infra.
105. Id. Cf. Phelps v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 70 Ill. App. 2d 89, 217 N.E.2d 519
(1966).
106. See generally Mazor, Power and Responsibility in the Attorney-Client Rela-
tionship, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1120 (1968).
107. E.g., Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Represenation as l Ground for
Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 289, 297 (1964).
108. Id.
109. While accepting in principle the notion that the client as principal should be
responsible for the negligence of his agent-attorney, the courts generally struggle to af-
ford relief from judgment attributable to the attorney's neglect. Cf., e.g., Daley v.
County of Butte, 227 Cal. App. 2d 380, 38 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1964). Some courts deny
relief from judgment on the ground that the client may instead recover in a malprac-
tice action against his attorney. Yet. the law of the attorney malpractice is weighted
against the client since lawyers are held to a standard of care that excuses errors in
judgment. See Note, Attorney Malpractice, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1229, 1299, 1312
March 1973]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
The Attorney as an "Officer of the Court"
The status of an attorney as an officer of the court may be traced
to seventeenth century England, at a time when the admission and con-
duct of attorneys was regulated by statute and by orders of the court.11 °
This regulatory tradition was adopted in this country and has continued
to the present day.'1 ' To say that an attorney is an "officer of the court"
does not mean that he is a public officer in the same sense as judge,
bailiff and clerk. Rather, the attorney, as licensee of the state, must
comply with rules of conduct which reflect his essential role in the ad-
ministration of justice.1 2  The question then becomes: in what legal
relationships does the attorney's special role in the adjudicatory pro-
cess justify a departure from legal principles which would otherwise
apply? It is submitted that the solution depends in part upon the strength
of policy commitments toward making legal services more widely avail-
able.
A common goal in recent reforms of the adjudicatory process has
been to seek an increase in its efficiency. For purposes of this note,
perfect efficiency is defined as the identification and resolution of all
meritorious claims. Although perfect efficiency may be neither obtain-
able nor desirable, there seems to be a consensus that the legal profes-
sion should be committed to achieving some greater degree of effi-
ciency."' The attorney-client relationship occupies a particularly
strategic position in the adjudicatory process and, hence, dispropor-
tionately impinges upon its efficiency. An attorney's services have
become virtually indispensable to the settlement or judicial resolution
of a legal claim, while the adversary system and professional stand-
ards of conduct generally require a civil claimholder to take the ini-
tiative in seeking legal counsel. The mobile urban society often fore-
stalls the establishment of legal reputations within a community." 4
Hence, whether a person takes the initiative to consult a lawyer depends
in part upon his general confidence in the legal profession. 5
n.167 (1963). Furthermore, in order to recover the client must prove that he could have
recovered on his underlying claim but for his attorney's negligence. See generally Gog-
gin, Attorney Negligence-A Suit Within a Suit, 60 W. VA. L. REv. 225 (1958).
110. 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 434 (1927).
111. See, e.g., Brydonjack v. State Bar of California, 208 Cal. 439, 443, 281 P.
1018, 1020 (1929); State Bar Act, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6000-6153 (West
1962). See generally Annot., 66 A.L.R. 1512 (1930).
112. See Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 520 (1966) (concurring opinion) (dic-
tum).
113. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY CANON 2, EC 2-25 (1971).
See generally Comment, Providing Legal Services for the Middle Class in Civil Matters:
The Problem, the Duty and a Solution, 26 U. PITT. L REV. 811 (1965).
114. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-6, 2-7 (1971).
115. See generally Cheatham, Availability of Legal Services: The Responsibility of
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It has been observed that the attorney-client relationship is
unique."" This is so in large part because of departures from other-
wise applicable rules to promote policies inherent in the concept of the
attorney as "officer of the court." The minority rule discussed in this
note is an illustration of judicial intervention in the attorney-client re-
lationship in the interest of greater efficiency in the adjudicatory pro-
cess. A basic assumption of the leading cases is that affording the cli-
ent a right to discharge the attorney without cause will promote pub-
lic confidence in the legal profession. 1 7  Increased public confidence
in the legal profesion would, in turn, encourage more persons who need
legal assistance to seek legal advice. Implicitly, public confidence
would be lessened by a rule which in effect forces a client to con-
tinue to be represented by an attorney in whom he has lost faith.""
In sum, the policy grounds for the minority rule have merit.
Whether the rule is an efficient means to promote these policies depends
upon the extent to which the benefits of the rule are offset by undesir-
able consequences. The concluding section of this note, therefore,
explores the consequences of the Fracasse rule.
Consequences of the Fracasse Decision
Three general inquiries will be made in order to identify and
evaluate the consequences of Fracasse: (1) In what remaining situa-
tions may a discharged attorney collect damages?" 9 (2) Is the delay
in accrual of the cause of action in quantum meruit necessary to ef-
the Individual Lawyer and of the Organized Bar, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 438 (1965).
"A wide gap separates the need for legal services and its satisfaction, as numerous
studies reveal. Looked at from the side of the layman, one reason for the gap is pov-
erty and the consequent inability to pay legal fees. Another set of reasons is ignorance
and fear on the part of those who could pay. There is ignorance of the need for and
the value of legal services, and ignorance of where to find a dependable lawyer. There
is fear of the mysterious processes and delays of the law, and there is fear of over-
reaching and overcharging by lawyers, a fear stimulated by occasional exposure of
shysters." Id.
116. See, e.g., Fracasse v. Brent, 6 Cal. 3d 784, 792, 494 P.2d 9, 14, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 385, 390 (1972).
117. "Without public confidence in members of the legal profession, which is de-
pendent upon absolute fairness in the dealings between attorney and client, courts can-
not function in the proper administration of justice." Id. at 789, 494 P.2d at 12, 100
Cal. Rptr. at 388. A similar observation was made in Martin v. Camp, 219 N.Y. 170,
114 N.E. 46 (1916). "The rule secures the attorney the right to recover the reason-
able value of the services which he has rendered and is well calculated to promote
public confidence in the members of an honorable profession whose relation to their
clients is personal and confidential." Id. at 176, 114 N.E. at 48.
118. 6 Cal. 3d at 789, 494 P.2d at 12, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
119, See text accompanying notes 122-31 infra,
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feet the general purpose of the rule?120  (3) Does limiting the attor-
ney's recovery to quantum merit create possible undesirable conse-
quences, such as reducing an attorney's incentive or encouraging in-
terference with contracts?' 2 '
Remaining Situations in Which Damages Are Recoverable
The Fracasse case does not rule out the possibility of an attorney's
recovery of damages for wrongful discharge. It is probable that the
quantum meruit limitation will be applied only where the attorney is
employed to represent the client in a specific legal matter and then dis-
charged after part performance. Recovery of the contract price thus
would be available where the attorney is hired on a general retainer,
is employed to perform a predominantly nonlegal task, or where
the attorney has fully performed. There is a further suggestion in
Fracasse that damages might be recoverable if the discharge were made
in bad faith.
These grounds for recovery of damages exist in other jurisdic-
tions which have adopted the minority rule. For example, in New
York, an attorney who renders general legal services for a specific
period at fixed periodic compensation may, upon wrongful discharge,
recover damages for breach of contract.12 2  Damages for wrongful dis-
charge have been awarded under general retainer contracts even though
the attorney maintained his own office and conducted other prac-
tice. 123  When an attorney is employed to perform services which a
nonlawyer could have performed, damages for wrongful discharge will
be allowed; the fact that such attorney may be called upon to use le-
gal skills does not conclusively create an attorney-client relation-
ship.'
24
A second area for the recovery of damages is found in Fracasse
itself. Although the decision affords a client the right to discharge
the attorney with or without cause, there is language to suggest that
the client would still be liable for breach of contract if the dis-
charge were made in bad faith. 25  Bad faith, in turn, is probably
present when the client has not in fact lost confidence in the integrity,
120. See text accompanying notes 132-40 infra.
121. See text accompanying notes 141-54 infra.
122. Greenberg v. Jerome H. Remick & Co., 230 N.Y. 70, 75, 129 N.E. 211, 213
(1920).
123. Roth v. Rural Const. Corp., 122 N.Y.S.2d 147, 148 (City Ct. 1953) (contract
for general legal services specifying duration and amount of compensation).
124. Mandel v. Liebman, 303 N.Y. 88, 97, 100 N.E.2d 149, 154 (1951).
125. See Fracasse v. Brent, 6 Cal. 3d 784, 790, 490 P.2d 9, 13, 100 Cal. Rptr. 385,
389 (1972): "It should be sufficient that the client has, for whatever reason, lost faith
in the attorney, to establish 'cause' for discharging him."
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loyalty or ability of his attorney.126 In order to determine whether the
discharge was in bad faith an inquiry will have to be made into the
client's motives. As Justice Sullivan's dissent points out, this substitu-
tion of subjective for objective tests departs from generally accepted
principles commonly employed in determining the existence and breach
of contracts.
127
Finally, if the attorney has fully performed, there is no possibility
of limiting the attorney's recovery to quantum meruit.128  Upon full
performance the attorney's right to the contract price vests, and the cli-
ent's purported termination of employment relation serves not as a
discharge but, at most, notice that the client does not intend to pay the
agreed compensation. 129 Hence, California's adoption of the minority
rule heightens the importance of deciding when the attorney has fully
performed. Determining whether full performance has occurred is
sometimes difficult in cases of an alleged settlement since an attor-
ney has no implied authority to compromise and settle a claim. 30 In
addition, complications can arise in deciding whether full performance
has occurred under contracts.' 3 '
Delay in Accrual of the Cause of Action
The provision in Fracasse delaying the accrual of the discharged
attorney's cause of action for quantum meruit under a contingent fee
contract until the happening of the contingency" 2 is both unique and
controversial. Certainly, the position is consistent with the further-
ance of the client's right to substitute atorneys, but two objections
have been raised. First, the original attorney bargained for the risk
that the client might not recover but he did not undertake the risk that
the client would discharge him without cause and entrust the case to an
incompetent successor. 33  Second, the client, by disaffirming the
126. For a case that would probably be considered a discharge in bad faith, see
Denio v. City of Huntington Beach, 22 Cal. 2d 580, 140 P.2d 394 (1943).
127. Fracasse v. Brent, 6 Cal. 3d at 802, 494 P.2d at 21, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 397;
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 230 (1932).
128. Oliver v. Campbell, 43 Cal. 2d 298, 273 P.2d 15 (1954) (limited attorney's
recovery to $750 contract price where value of services exceeded $5000); Miller v.
Wing, 9 Cal. App. 2d 483, 50 P.2d 470 (1935).
129. See, e.g., Dill v. Public Util. Dist. No. 2, 3 Wash. App. 360, 365, 475 P.2d
309, 312 (1970) (dictum).
130. Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 944 (1952).
131. See Dill v. Public Util. Dist. No. 2, 3 Wash. App. 360, 475 P.2d 309 (1970)
(under terms of particular contingent fee contract, attorney may have fully performed
even though the contingency did not occur until several years after discharge).
132. See text accompanying notes 40-43 supra.
133. See Tracy v. MacIntyre, 29 Cal. App. 2d 145, 147-48, 84 P.2d 526, 528
(1938).
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contract, cannot then selectively enforce its provisions. The contract
should either stand or fall in its entirety.
1 34
Less onerous means can be devised to effect the general purpose
of the provision in Fracasse regarding accrual. The primary rationale
for delaying the accrual was that the "amount involved" and "results
obtained," both factors in determining reasonable value of services,
cannot be ascertained in cases where the contract is for a contingent
fee until the happening of the contingency. The procedure presently
used in New York, a state adhering to the minority rule, more ade-
quately protects both the interests of the discharged attorney and
client. A court in New York may, by virtue of an attorney's lien stat-
ute, fix an amount upon ordering the substitution of attorneys which
becomes a charging lien upon the client's cause of action. 135  In
Martucci v. Brooklyn Children's Aid Society,'3" a percentage amount
of the ultimate recovery was deemed improper because it does not
fall within the description of quantum meruit.1
7
If approved, this practice would have reached the same result as
Fracasse; if the client recovers nothing, the attorney receives nothing
for his services. The current law in New York has reached a com-
promise in which the outgoing attorney is given two alternatives. He
either may take a fixed dollar amount or he may take a contingent
amount or percentage determined in an ancillary proceeding at the
conclusion of the case.' Presumably, if an attorney elects the pres-
ent fixing of quantum meruit, the value of his services will be reduced
by the presently uncertain amount involved and results obtained.
In California, the court is presently not authorized to fix the com-
pensation of the outgoing attorney pursuant to the order of substitu-
tion.'39 The discharged attorney is not allowed to intervene in the cli-
ent's suit but must bring an independent action to seek judgment for
compensation. 1 0 A statutory amendment enabling the court to fix com-
pensation incident to substitution would be desirable.
Possible Undesirable Consequences of Fracasse
The Fracasse decision may produce some undesirable conse-
134. Tillman v. Komar, 259 N.Y. 133, 181 N.E. 75 (1932).
135. N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 475 (McKinney 1968).
136. 284 N.Y. 408, 31 N.E.2d 506 (1940); accord, Tillman v. Komar, 259 N.Y.
133, 181 N.E. 75 (1932).
137. 284 N.Y. at 409, 31 N.E.2d at 507.
138. Kern v. Karnbach, 279 N.Y.S.2d 252 (App. Div. 1967); see Paolillo v. Amer-
ican Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 250, 251 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)
(dictum).
139. See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 284 (West Supp. 1972).
140. Meadow v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. 2d 610, 381 P.2d 648, 30 Cal. Rptr. 824
(1963).
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quences, which, on examination, prove to be small in comparison to
the benefits. The potential undesirable consequences include: de-
mand for higher retainer fees, reluctance to enter into contingent fee
contracts, increased incentive for third persons to interfere in the attor-
ney-client contract, decreased incentive for attorneys to work diligently
on behalf of clients whom they suspect may discharge them, and fin-
ally, attempts to circumvent the quantum meruit limitation.
Fracasse may lead to demands for higher retaining fees, because
it is generally agreed that a discharged attorney is entitled to the retain-
ing fee even though it exceeds the reasonable value of his services.
141
Clearly, demands for larger retaining fees would be counterproductive
to the goal of increasing the availability of legal services.
It might be argued that limiting the discharged attorney's recov-
ery to quantum meruit would encourage tortious interference' 42 with
attorney-client contracts of employment. Such an argument might
proceed on the recognized principle that no cause of action arises
for inducing a party to a contract to exercise an absolute right.-48 For
example, an attorney has no cause of action against a person who in-
duces the attorney's client to settle the claim.144  The client has an
unqualified right to settle;145 the attorney cannot complain that a larger
contingent fee might have been obtained had the cause been pursued
to judgment. 46 Under the same reasoning one might argue that
no cause of action would arise against one who has induced a client to
exercise the implied term affording him the "right" '14 to discharge his
attorney with or without cause.
It would be erroneous to conclude that the minority rule affords
an absolute right to discharge attorneys and therefore precludes an ac-
tion for interference with contract. Yet, because courts commonly
regard the minority rule as a means of protecting a client's "right" of
discharge, the possibility of reaching this erroneous conclusion is en-
hanced.14 8 Nevertheless, as previously discussed, the minority rule
141. See Annot, 21 A.L.R. 1442 (1922). Theoretically a retaining fee does not
compensate but merely secures the services of an attorney. If allowing the discharged
attorney to retain such fees threatens to undermine the purpose of the minority rule,
a jurisdiction could compel the remittance of retaining fees where the discharge has been
for cause. See Rimos v. Rimos, 81 N.Y.S.2d 347 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
142. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 129 (4th ed.
1971).
143. See Annot., 26 A.L.R.2d 1227 § 23 (1952).
144. See, e.g., Herbits v- Constitution Indem. Co., 279 Mass. 539, 181 N.E. 723
(1932).
145. See generally 7 Am. Jun. 2d Attorneys at Law § 149 (1963).
146. See note 142 supra.
147. See note 62 supra.
148. See Orenstein v. Alpert, 20 App. Div. 2d 720, 247 N.Y.S.2d 563 (Sup.
Ct. App. Div. 1964).
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does not afford an unqualified right of discharge. 14 9 Actions have
been sustained for interference with contractual relations between at-
torney and client under both the majority'5" and minority rules.' 51
It is possible to argue that the Fracasse rule, by rewarding con-
scientious effort with the same measure of recovery as unconscientious
effort, may, in some cases, discourage zealous representation. An at-
torney who believes that his client may be disposed to discharge him is
not given an incentive to guarantee that the discharge will be without
cause. This criticism, however, is a two edged sword; it can be used
either in support of a return to the majority rule or as an argument
that attorneys who are discharged for cause should be denied quan-
tum meruit recovery. New York, for example, has taken the latter po-
sition.'112  In order to be consistent with the policy expressed in Fra-
casse, California might do the same.
In some cases, attorneys may attempt to circumvent the Fracasse
rule by suing upon an account stated instead of upon the original con-
tract. In Meagher v. Kavlil" the court refused to find an account
stated in a suit by a discharged attorney. The court observed that in
contracts to perform professional services, silence by the recipient of an
account has little or no evidentiary value as indicating an acceptance
of the amount stated. 1
5 4
Conclusion
In a growing minority of states, the measure of recovery of an
attorney discharged by the client after part performance is limited to
quantum meruit. This limitation upon the attorney's recovery fur-
thers the important public policies of securing for each client an attor-
ney in whom he has confidence and of making legal services more
widely available. California's recent adoption of this minority rule
hopefully will stimulate other states to re-examine the utility of apply-
ing ordinary contract principles to this aspect of the attorney-client
contract of employment.
William D. Hunter*
149. See note 19 supra.
150. State Farm Fire Ins. Co. v. Gregory, 184 F.2d 447 (4th Cir. 1950) (South
Carolina); State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 107 Ariz. 498, 489 P.2d 837
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